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Abstract 
The Slovenian Corporate Governance Code for Public Joint-Stock Companies 
was adopted in March 2004.  Using a systems-theoretical approach, we examine 
the extent to which the implementation of the Code has resulted in the kinds of 
‘reflexive’ learning processes which the ‘comply or explain’ approach aims to 
bring about.  The adoption of the Code has already had an impact on the wider 
legal system, triggering certain changes in the body of core company law, and 
assisting  the  process  of  adjustment  to  EU-level  norms.    On  the  whole, 
companies’ implementation strategies are strikingly similar both in terms of the 
contents of deviations as well as in the type of disclosure and explanations for 
deviations. At the same time, the quality of disclosures is low, with effective 
comply-or-explain  declarations  representing  only  a  small  minority  of 
disclosures.    On  this  basis,  the  Code  has  been  more  effective,  to  date,  in 
legitimating Slovenia’s adjustment to transnational norms and standards, than in 
stimulating institutional learning. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate governance codes are generally viewed as a mechanism to foster the 
evolution of capital markets by increasing the transparency of business and the 
level  of  shareholder  protection.  Standard  law  and  economic  approaches  to 
corporate  governance  codes,  however,  fail  to  capture  the  complex  nature  of 
these codes, particularly in the context of transitional economies. The standard 
view sees issues of transition exclusively from an agency-theory framework and 
is therefore able to offer a set of hypotheses about managerial entrenchment, 
rent seeking behaviour and legal origin. However, it encounters problems in 
adequately  presenting  the  process  of  the  transplantation  and  transmission  of 
norms.  These issues prompt a deeper look into the nature and evolution of the 
norms contained in corporate governance codes, of the kind offered by systems 
theory.   
 
Systems-theoretical  approaches  agree  with  those  of  the  modern  law  and 
economics tradition concerning the need to escape traditional crude command 
and control forms of regulation.  However,  having observed the frequent failure 
of laws to have their intended effects and the persistence of inefficient laws, 
systems-based approaches attempt to construct a more complete theory of the 
relation between the law and the economy. While law and economics explains 
the inability of corporate governance reform to proceed as intended on the basis 
of the diversity of systems, and blockages between law and economy in terms of 
path dependence and public choice-style inefficiencies, autopoiesis points to a 
much deeper, structural problem of the separation of the legal and economic 
spheres, and their indirect, mutual co-evolution.  
 
This paper employs concepts of the modern theory of social systems introduced 
by Luhmann (1995, 2004) and Teubner (1993) and builds on the idea of system 
autonomy,  the  notion  of  operationally  closed  but  structurally  open  social 
systems linked by mechanisms of structural coupling, to offer a more complete 
account  of  the  operation  of  corporate  governance  codes.  By  pointing  to  the 
structural issue of the separation of the legal and economic spheres and their 
interdependence,  this  approach  offers  a  better  understanding  of  the  complex 
law-economy relationship and explores the contribution that studying corporate 
governance  codes  can  make  to  understanding  of  that  relationship.  This 
perspective makes it possible to look at mutual interactions between law and the 
economy: to examine how law influences economic changes through the code 
implementation  process,  as  well  as  how  the  economic  system,  in  its  turn, 
triggers changes in law and affects the development of the code provisions. The 
merit of this approach lies in capturing the complex environment of, and the 
historical interplay between, regulation and business, highlighting the non-linear  
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and non-deterministic nature of the process of change. Moreover, by introducing 
the  idea  of  social  autonomy  and  structural  coupling  between  social  systems, 
systems theory does not just open up a new way of analysing the way in which 
the  legal  system  is  linked  both  to  political  legitimization  and  economic 
efficiency; it also captures an important aspect of law’s responsiveness to the 
dynamics of ‘civil society’ (Teubner, 1993). 
 
The  focus  for  our  empirical  study  is  the  implementation  and  reception  of 
corporate governance codes in transition systems.  These present a particularly 
challenging environment for the transposition of corporate governance norms.  
We look in detail at the case of the implementation of the corporate governance 
code in Slovenia in 2004, and examine its dual impact on the legal system and 
on economic relations since that point.   
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section our theoretical framework 
is  introduced.  Section  3  explains  the  importance  of  the  Slovenian  case  for 
studying  the  reflexive  properties  of  corporate  governance  codes.  Section  4 
presents  empirical  findings  concerning  the  legal  impact  of  the  code  and  its 
effects upon the practices of listed companies.  Section 5 concludes.    
 
2.  A  theoretical  framework  for  understanding  corporate  governance 
‘transplants’ in transition systems 
 
In the countries of central and eastern Europe (‘CCE states’) and the former 
Soviet Union, adjustment to the institutional needs of a market economy since 
the early 1990s has taken the form of extensive privatization coupled with far-
reaching legal reforms.  In terms of the formal law, shareholder and creditor 
rights  quite  quickly  reached  a  level  which  some  commentators  regarded  as 
comparable (if not superior) to those in countries with a more continuous history 
of market-based economic development (Pistor, 2000).  However, the adoption 
of these laws seems to have had a tenuous relationship with the growth of stock 
markets.  Research carried out for the EBRD in the early 2000s suggested that 
corporate governance in transition systems was still characterised by over-strong 
incumbent  managers,  weak  outside  investors,  a  lack  of  external  finance  for 
firms, and a continuing heavy influence of the state, expressed through taxation 
policy, the retention of golden shares and the use of regulatory favours.  The 
formal  provisions  of  company  and  commercial  law  were  less  important  as 
determinants of the use by firms of external finance than the general perception 
of  the  state  of  legality  (or  the  ‘rule  of  law’)  and  the  effectiveness  of  legal 
enforcement in a given country.  The authors of this study concluded that ‘it is 
unlikely  that  in  the  foreseeable  future  the  development  of  the  law  will  be 
matched by the development of financial markets’, at least until such time as a  
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‘more important constraint on financial market development’, the fragility of 
legal institutions, had been addressed (Pistor et al., 2000: 13). 
 
For some commentators, the apparent lack of success of legal reform strategies 
in transition systems should not be seen to detract from a more fundamental 
long-run process of realignment with market-based legal orders; ‘normality’ will 
eventually  be  achieved  as  a  consequence  of  the  expected  convergence  of 
systems on the core features of the Anglo-American model.  Thus dilution of 
minority shareholder interests is a ‘nearly universal practice’ in ‘middle income 
and developing countries’, which legal reforms will eventually alleviate once 
economic development reaches a certain level (Shleifer and Treisman, 2003).  
An  alternative  view  sees  the  experience  of  transition  in  terms  of  a  wider 
difficulty  in  transplanting  legal  mechanisms  and  concepts  across  national 
systems.  Legal transplants work best in contexts where the host state already 
has a developed legal order, and where foreign laws are adapted to suit local 
conditions;  where  these  conditions  are  not  present,  transplants  can  actively 
undermine  the  effectiveness  of  legal  institutions,  while  making  little  or  no 
contribution  to  economic  development  in  their  own  right  (Berkowitz  et  al., 
2003).    On  this  basis,  path  dependence  and  cross-national  diversity  pose  a 
serious obstacle to institutional reform, which may nevertheless be addressed by 
measures which are sensitive to the circumstances of individual countries. 
 
The recent adoption of corporate governance codes in several transition systems 
offers  an  important  opportunity  to  re-evaluate  this  debate.    Corporate 
governance codes consist of guidance for firms (normally, listed companies) on 
what  constitutes  best  practice  on  matters  which  include  board  structure, 
executive compensation and relations with shareholders.  Following the model 
of the UK’s Cadbury Code of 1991, they tend to be principles-based rather than 
relying solely on prescriptive rules (although many, including the UK’s own 
Combined Code, now contain quite detailed rules).  They do not depend on the 
legal  system  for  their  enforcement  but  on  a  mixture  of  regulatory  authority 
exercised by stock exchanges and listing authorities, and on investor opinion.  
This is the core of the ‘comply or explain’ approach: companies have a choice of 
whether to follow the guidance set out in the code, or to explain why they have 
chosen not to, leaving the final judgement to the stock market.  Although claims 
that  codes  improve  corporate  performance  directly  have  proved  difficult  to 
substantiate (see Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003), there is evidence to suggest 
that, in the context of systems which already have liquid capital markets such as 
Britain and America, compliance with codes helps to cut the cost of raising 
external capital for firms, and enhances investor confidence (McKinsey, various 
years).   
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Since  the  adoption  of  the  Cadbury  Code,  which  was  not  the  first  corporate 
governance code but which has been the most influential, there has been a rapid 
dissemination  of  the  code  model  worldwide.    If  the  adoption  of  a  code  is 
generally understood as a signal that a country is committed to improving its 
corporate  governance  system,  this  is  because  of  a  widely  held  belief  that 
‘countries  with  effective  corporate  governance  systems  become  not  only 
attractive locations for domestic companies to prosper and invest, but also for 
foreign investors, and thus promote economic growth’ (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004: 416, references omitted).   
 
From  a  law-and-economics  perspective,  corporate  governance  codes 
complement the basic provisions of company law in providing a template for the 
publicly  listed  corporation  which  serves  to  reduce  agency  costs  and  align 
managerial  behaviour  with  shareholder  interests.    According  to  this  point  of 
view, there is an emerging global consensus that companies are managed most 
effectively  when  managers  are  made  ‘strongly  accountable  to  shareholder 
interests, and, at least in direct terms, only to those interests’ (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2001: 441).  Obstacles lie in the path of convergence, in the form of 
resistance  from  vested  interests  such  as  those  of  incumbent  managers  and 
owners who are in a position to extract private benefits from controlling stakes, 
coupled with the costs of making legislative changes.  However, there is an 
expectation  that  ‘corporate  governance  practices  will  generally  precede  the 
reform  of  corporate  law,  for  the  simple  reason  that  governance  practice  is 
largely  a  matter  of  private  ordering  that  does  not  require  legislative  action’ 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001: 455), a trend which will be accelerated by the 
growing influence of institutional shareholders and by their greater willingness 
to invest on a global scale.   
 
A comparative political economy perspective offers a more sceptical point of 
view.    This  stresses  the  diversity  of  contemporary  systems  of  corporate 
governance and questions the universal relevance of the agency model (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003).  From this angle, the dissemination of corporate 
governance codes is likely to run up against resistance in ‘coordinated market 
economies’ for which an agency model of the firm is inappropriate.  The model 
of the corporate governance code, with its stress on aligning managerial interests 
with those of shareholders and offering a limited role (at best) for labour in 
governance processes, bears the marks of its origin in Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance practice.  As such, it can be seen as a response to a particular set of 
problems,  associated  with  the  separation  of  ownership  and  control  in  large 
corporations,  which  are  particular  to  so-called  ‘liberal  market’  systems  with 
diffuse  share  ownership  and  liquid  capital  markets.    In ‘coordinated market’ 
economies, the concentration of ownership in the hand of insider shareholders  
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has  historically  been  counterbalanced  by  the  provision  of  voice  rights  to 
employees at the level of the firm in various forms up to and including the 
model  of  codetermination  found  in  German-influenced  systems,  and  these 
complementary institutions have helped to foster competitive strategies based 
around  a  high  degree  of  firm-specific  investments  in  skills  and  capabilities.  
Given the presence of strong insiders, it can be argued that the problem to be 
addressed  by  governance  structures  is  the  potential  exploitation  of  minority 
shareholders  by  those  with  controlling  stakes,  rather  than  the  danger  of 
incumbent managers exploiting shareholders as a group.  To that extent, the 
model implicit in Anglo-Saxon corporate codes may just be irrelevant.   
 
More  negatively,  the  introduction  of  a  corporate  governance  model  which 
stresses managerial accountability to shareholders alone would go against the 
grain of managerial strategies and organisational practices which characterize 
large  publicly-held  firms  in  coordinated  systems.    For  the  proponents  of  a 
shareholder value approach, the disturbance induced by corporate governance 
reforms  would  be  welcome  in  so  far  as  it  served  to  undermine  managerial 
strategies which are, at their core, inefficient, in the sense of favouring private 
interests at the expense of the value of overall returns to the firm (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2001: 463).  However, from a comparative institutional viewpoint, 
the danger with such an approach is that ‘grafting market-based institutional 
forms  onto  a  model  organized  according  to  very  different  complementarities 
…is bound to be inefficient’ (Amable, 2003: 24), an argument which may also 
be relevant to transition economies which have not historically had high levels 
of capital market liquidity (Berglöf and Von Thadden, 1999).  
 
Empirical  evidence  on  the  adoption  of  corporate  governance  codes  does  not 
clearly support either point of view.  Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) , in 
their study of 49 countries (none of which were transition systems), found that 
countries which had weaker shareholder protection regimes were more likely to 
adopt new codes in the period 1978-1999, but that, cutting across this finding, 
those with civil law legal systems were less likely to do than those of common 
law  origin.    One  reason  for  this  is  that  ‘the  intrinsic  characteristics  of  the 
common-law  legal  system  facilitate  the  enforceability  of  codes  of  good 
governance’ (2004: 434).  This is because, these authors argue, good practice in 
the  area  of  corporate  governance  is  more  likely  to  influence  the  courts  and 
thereby  to  achieve  a  degree  of  legal  enforceability  in  common  law  systems, 
which  rely  on  rule-making  through  judicial  precedents,  than  in  civil  law 
systems, where there is greater reliance on legislation and statutory reform to 
achieve legal change.  In making this argument, they assume that countries with 
a  common  law  legal  system  are,  for  that  reason,  those  with  ‘more  effective 
governance systems in terms of the overall legal system’, a view which, while  
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compatible with an agency approach, may be questioned.  The reason they give 
for thinking that common law systems are more efficient than those of civil law 
origins is not particularly convincing; the assertion that the common law adjusts 
more flexibly to changes in commercial practice, thanks to the more prominent 
role of the courts in decision making, ignores the predominant role of legislation 
in  the development  of  Anglo-American  company  law  and  its  variants,  while 
glossing over the often very active role of the courts in shaping company law in 
civilian jurisdictions (Pistor, 2005; Ahlering and Deakin, 2007).  Their finding is 
however,  compatible  with  the  possibility  that  corporate  governance  codes, 
because of their origins in Anglo-American practice, are more complementary to 
the institutions of common law systems than to those of the civil law, a position 
which is consistent with a comparative political economy perspective.  They 
also find that factors influencing the adoption of codes are not confined to a 
desire  to  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  systems,  but  include  pressures  to 
legitimate  systems  by  responding  to  what  is  seen  as  an  emerging  global 
standard, regardless of how it is implemented.  Thus the rate of code adoption is 
linked  to  the  degree  to  which  a  country  is  integrated  into  the  world  trading 
system, how far it has undergone a process of internal economic liberalization 
and privatisation, and to the presence of foreign institutional investors.  This 
implies  that  the  diffusion  of  codes  is  only  partly  related  to  efficiency 
considerations, and may even be in the nature of a ‘fad’ (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004).  
 
So  far  we  have  been  considering  the  question  of  corporate  governance 
transplants  from  the  point  of  view  of  alternative  economic-theoretical 
perspectives.    However,  corporate  governance  codes  are  not  simply 
instantiations or expressions of a particular economic model of the firm; they are 
autonomous institutional phenomena with the potential to reshape the legal and 
economic orders into which they are incorporated, and to be modified in their 
turn by those orders.  From this angle, the issue is not so much whether they can 
be successfully transplanted; the transplant metaphor overstates the degree to 
which  there  are  just  two  alternative  outcomes  of  the  diffusion  process, 
acceptance  or  rejection  of  the  rule  or  institution  which  is  being  transposed.  
Instead, as Teubner (2001) suggests, legal or regulatory transfers more often 
operate as ‘irritants’ which trigger unexpected consequences in host systems.   
 
Consistently with the autopoietic or systems-theoretical approach which informs 
his work, Teubner insists that a distinction be drawn between economic and 
legal institutions: if ‘economic institutions are constraint and incentive structures 
that  influence  cost-benefit  calculations  of  economic  actors’  then  legal 
institutions ‘are ensembles of legally valid rules that structure the resolution of 
conflicts’ (2001: 435).  It follows that ‘economic institutions and legal ones are  
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not  only  analytically  but  empirically  distinct  from  each  other’  (ibid.).    This 
account is not necessarily incompatible with the premise of Aoki’s ‘comparative 
institutional  analysis’  (Aoki,  2001),  namely  that  economic  institutions  are 
summary  representations  of  equilibria  which  emerge  from  the  interaction  of 
agents in particular contextual settings.  However, rather than saying, as Aoki 
does, that ‘statutory laws or institutions may induce an institution to evolve, but 
they  themselves  are  not  institutions’  (Aoki,  2001:  20),  Teubner’s  approach 
presupposes that legal phenomena have an institutional quality within their own 
‘domain’ (to adapt Aoki’s term), that is to say, at the level of the legal system 
itself.  The validity of legal norms is determined by internal rules of recognition, 
rather  than  their  functionality  with  regard  to  external  economic  phenomena.  
Legal  and  economic  phenomena  nevertheless  co-evolve,  in  the  sense  of 
reciprocally  influencing  each  other’s  development  over  time;  neither  one  is 
reducible  to  the  other.    It  follows  that  legal  institutions  are  fitted,  to  some 
degree, to the economic environment or background against which they emerge.   
 
To illustrate his argument, Teubner gives the example of the civil law concept of 
good faith in commercial dealings: its development has been ‘closely linked to a 
specific  production  regime’,  associated  with  the  German  model,  in  which 
corporate  governance  and  corporate  finance  favour  a  long-term  strategic 
approach,  industrial  relations  are  based  on  explicit  norms  of  cooperation 
between management and labour, inter-firm relations take the form of networks 
of relational contracting, and trade associations play a prominent role in standard 
setting in conjunction with government.  When the concept of good faith was 
transposed into English law, thanks to harmonizing legislation at EU level,
1 the 
result was a ‘perturbation’ of the legal system which had the potential for knock-
on  effects  on  commercial  relations.    However,  it  is  essential  to  Teubner’s 
argument  that  this  should  not  be  seen  as  a  case  of  a  ‘rejected  transplant’.  
Although, in the context of the German system, good faith operated to mitigate 
some of the risks of mutual dependence of the contracting parties, in the British 
context  it  had  the  potential  to  function  somewhat  differently,  to  ‘[set]  firm 
boundaries to market dynamics’ (2001: 439).  Thus it cannot be assumed that 
legal  and  economic  institutions  are  so  tightly  coupled  as  to  rule  out  the 
possibility that they will be adapted, in some way, to their new setting.  This is 
partly  a  function  of  the  growing  influence  of  transnational  sources  of  legal 
norms.  The meaning of the term ‘good faith’ had already been altered when it 
was included in the European directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts; 
this process continued when the directive was implemented at the level of the 
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Teubner’s analysis highlights the need for empirical analysis which is capable of 
identifying  with  some  precision  the  complex  effects  which  transplants  or 
‘irritants’ may induce.  His suggestion that the consequences of transplantation 
are often unexpected, and, indeed, unpredictable, should not be taken to suggest 
that they cannot be effectively studied.  It does, however, imply that the use of 
generalised models of national regimes of production – whether based around 
the contrast between liberal and coordinated systems, or between developed, 
developing and transition economies – may not be much guide to the way codes 
are received and operate in practice.  Individual country studies are needed in 
order to assess the impact of codes at the level of the legal orders into which 
they are implanted, and the wider economic systems of the countries concerned. 
 
With  this  type  of  comparative  institutional  analysis  in  mind,  three  particular 
features  of  corporate  governance  codes  stand  out.    The  first  is  that, 
notwithstanding their origins in systems of the common law tradition, and in 
American  and  British  practice  in  particular,  they  should  not  be  seen  as 
irredeemably tied to the particular features of liberal market systems, such as 
diffuse  share  ownership  and  liquid  capital  markets.    Corporate  governance 
principles are now formally stated in transnational instruments, the most notable 
being the model code of the OECD, which, while still retaining much of the 
shareholder value orientation of the original Anglo-American codes, also makes 
reference  to  stakeholder  concerns.    The  implementation  of  codes  at  national 
level is quite often sensitive to local circumstances, so that the basic model has 
been adapted (formally at least) to systems with two-tier boards, concentrated 
share  ownership,  family  control,  and  codetermination  (Aguilera  and  Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004: 436).  This leaves open the question of how codes operate in 
practice – their formal implementation provides only part of the picture.  How 
do codes operate in practice in systems – such as those of transition economies – 
which do not have experience of stock market liquidity or a prominent role, as 
of yet, for institutional shareholders?  Can codes be used in such circumstances 
to trigger a loosening of existing ownership blocks?   What are the effects of 
their introduction upon managerial structure and behaviour? 
 
Secondly,  corporate  governance  codes  are  a  particularly  interesting  case  for 
empirical study because of their dual nature as products of both the economic 
system and the legal system.  The earliest codes were the result of deliberations 
by autonomous industry bodies, such as the City institutions which supported 
the  setting  up  of  the  Cadbury  Commission  in  the  UK.    In  the  case  of  the 
Cadbury  Code,  the  indirect  influence  of  government,  and  the  possibility  of 
government action if an effective self-regulatory solution was not forthcoming, 
was present in the background, and government influence has been even more 
strongly  to  the  fore  in  some  of  the  more  recent  amendments  to  the  UK’s  
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Combined Code, such as those following on from the Higgs Report of 2002.  
However, it remains the case that the basic model of the corporate governance 
code is one which attempts to abstract from good practice as it is generally 
understood to apply among the better run companies and to express a consensus 
among the relevant business and professional bodies.  As successive countries 
have adopted the basic model with variations, and the earliest codes have been 
modified  in  their  countries of  origin,  additional attempts  have  been  made  to 
encapsulate developments in the practice of large corporations, and to respond to 
new issues as they arise.  In this sense, corporate governance codes can be seen 
as products of the economic system, broadly understood to include practices at 
firm level and at the level of business associations and self-regulatory bodies.   
 
Codes are, at the same time, outputs of the legal order.  Like standard form 
contracts or collective agreements, while they derive their substance from the 
deliberations of autonomous social actors, they take a form which is to large 
degree influenced by the legal system, and which is designed to be compatible 
with  and  recognisable  by  it.    Corporate  governance  guidelines  may  be  non-
binding, in a strict legal sense, but they are produced in a ‘script-coded’ form 
which mimics that of legislation.  They are open to interpretation in a way which 
makes them amenable to being incorporated into rules of the positive law at 
appropriate points.   
 
From  a  systemic  viewpoint,  then,  corporate  governance  codes  are  ‘linkage 
institutions’ which operate at the point where ‘structural coupling’ between the 
economic and legal systems can be identified.  Structural coupling, in Teubner’s 
sense, does not imply a point-by-point similarity or congruence of legal and 
economic forms; on the contrary, he views structural coupling as based on a 
‘productive misunderstanding’ of each system by the other; the legal system, 
through its own distinctive processes and discourses, ‘distorts’ the social order 
and ‘recontextualises’ the meaning of social phenomena in its own terms.  The 
same process is at work when the economic system receives ‘instructions’ from 
the legal order, in the sense of attempting to implement legal norms at the level 
of the market or individual firm.  The governing assumption of systems theory is 
that information from one system cannot be transposed directly into the other.  
However,  their  interaction  takes  a  particular  form  when  it  is  mediated  by 
‘hybrid’ institutions such as codes or standards which operate simultaneously in 
both the legal and economic orders.  This opens up a further set of empirical 
questions for analysis.  What types of evolutionary responses do codes trigger in 
the  legal  and  economic  contexts  in  which  they  are  applied;  and  can  any 
conclusions be drawn concerning the implications of these responses for the 
regulatory effectiveness of codes? 
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Thirdly, and relatedly, corporate governance codes are an example of regulatory 
instruments which are explicitly designed to be ‘reflexive’ – that is, to trigger a 
learning  process  which  will  over  time  will  enable  them  to  incorporate 
developments from practice.  Thus codes are not just non-binding in a strict 
legal  sense;  through  the  ‘comply  or  explain’  mechanism,  they  are  meant  to 
induce a range of responses from firms.  Non-compliance with the formal terms 
of the guidance is, in fact, an option, as long as the firm in question offers a 
reasoned explanation for the choice it has made.  The sanction of de-listing as a 
penalty for failing to offer a clear explanation is present in most cases, but this is 
rarely  exercised;  market  pressure,  investor  sentiment  and  reputational  effects 
may be more effective sanctions in practice.  But this prompts an additional set 
of questions.  When codes are implemented, what degree of variation in the 
responses  of  firms  can  be  observed?    How  is  the  information  processed  by 
market actors?  How are the results to be evaluated? 
 
With these considerations in mind, we now turn to our empirical study. 
 
3. Transitional systems and the importance of the Slovenian case 
 
In the last few decades the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been 
dominated by transition processes that have shaped their economic development, 
institutional  set  up  and  balances  of  power.  Different  privatisation  techniques 
were applied, resulting in various ownership structures and a range of outcomes 
in  terms  of  economic  stabilisation  and  growth.  In  essence,  all  transition 
countries  were  facing  a  choice  of  ‘gradualism’  versus  ‘shock  therapy’.  
Institutional reform could either precede privatisation, or follow it (Crotty and 
Jobome,  2004).  Poland,  for  example,  has  followed  a  highly  gradualistic, 
consensual  approach  to  privatisation  which  favoured  swift  macroeconomic 
stabilisation,  and  at  the  same  time,  a  gradual  implementation  of  institutional 
changes. Russia and Czech Republic, in contrast, opted for mass privatisation 
techniques  which  aimed  at  quickly  creating  a  demand  for  private  ownership 
structures, and put on hold the creation of an enduring institutional framework 
(Kozarzewski, 2006).  
 
Despite different privatisation approaches, similarities in the core principles of 
privatisation  programmes,  the  legacy  of  the  centrally  planned  economy  and 
common  historical  and  cultural  ties  eventually  resulted  in  several  shared 
corporate  governance  characteristics  in  the  transition  states.    These  included 
strong  insider  owners,  concentrated  ownership  structures,  and  management 
ownership of the firm. Insider control is particularly strong in Poland, where 
managers hold blocks of up to 93% of voting rights, with an average block being 
28.5% (Dzierzanowski and Tamowicz, 2002); it has also been high in Russia,  
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where in the mid 1990s insiders held 70% of shares in privatized companies 
(Carlin,  2000).  In  addition,  heavy  ownership  concentration  is  observed  in 
transition countries, with the median largest stake being above 40%, and in some 
countries well over 50% (Berglof and Pajuste, 2003). In Poland, for example, 
the  median size of the largest block in publicly quoted companies increased 
from  18%  in  the  early  1990s  to  45%  in  2000,  with  de-concentration  being 
recorded  only  in  1993  and  1996  (Dzierzanowski  and  Tamowicz,  2002). 
Concentrated insider ownership structures, coupled with an underdeveloped, not 
yet properly evolved class of professional managers, have resulted in controlling 
shareholders being actively involved in the management of companies. This, in 
turn,  has  placed  the  conflict  between  controlling  shareholders  and  minority 
shareholders  at  the  centre  of  the  corporate  governance  debate  in  transition 
economies (Berglof and Pajuste, 2003). A continental European company law 
model, with two-tier boards, employee participation and strong insider interests 
has been widely implemented.  
 
Furthermore,  capital  markets  in  transition  economies  remain  underdeveloped 
and, despite varying significantly from country to country, the level of foreign 
direct investments is still low.  Investment culture in general is well below that 
in  developed  economies:  the  application  of  legal  rules  is  uncertain  and 
inconsistent, and often neglects country-specific characteristics; administrative 
barriers to efficiency remain high; and the underdevelopment of the financial 
sector  results  in  problems  with  companies  accessing  external  finance 
(Kozarzewski,  2006).  Empirical  data  show  that  inadequacies  of  current 
legislation, weak protection of minority shareholders and fragility of the judicial 
system in settling corporate dispute are the most sensitive corporate governance 
issues in several transition countries such as Poland, Russia and Ukraine, with 
the latter two also experiencing a very low level of application, in practice, of 
international  financial  standards,  notwithstanding  significant  reforms  to  the 
formal law (Kozarzewski, 2007). In systems such as Romania, the rapid pace of 
change in company law has not been matched by reforms in the functioning of 
the wider legal system. Shareholder activism in Romania is reported to remain 
low and best practices are not yet widely adopted.  The majority of managers of 
Romanian  listed  companies  consider  corporate  governance  principles 
complicated  and  costly  to  implement  (Duca  et  al,  2007).  Nonetheless,  an 
improvement  in  the  quality  of  information  disclosed  in  financial  reports  is 
observed across transition systems, which is consistent also with the general 
trend  of  increasing  the  level  of  online  disclosure  of  corporate  governance 
information in CEE countries over the past few years. As of the beginning of 
2008, over 95% of the CEE companies had an English-language website and 
over  85%  of  CEE  companies  had  English-language  annual  report  available  
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online,  while  only  25%  published  a  stand-alone  English-language 
environmental, social and governance report (PFS Survey, 2008) 
In  such  an  environment,  the  corporate  governance  debate  in  transition 
economies  has  changed  over  time.    It  began  as  a  debate  focused  mainly  on 
specific privatisation issues such as performance of newly privatised companies, 
the  nature  of  the  economic  and  social  relationships  between  managers  and 
owners, the effects of transfers of ownership from the state into private hands, 
and the implications of the emergence of outside owners.  It has increasingly 
become focused on issues relating to the role of market regulation and disclosure 
rules in fostering investor confidence in capital markets.  These issues, along 
with a focus on enhancing capital liquidity, have moved to the forefront of the 
corporate governance agenda, triggering the implementation of novel regulatory 
instruments, including corporate governance codes. 
 
The adoption of the Slovenian corporate governance code took place in a  legal 
and economic context similar to those in other transition countries. Slovenia has 
followed  a  gradual  approach  in  transition.  The  priority  of  the  reform  was 
macroeconomic stability, resulting in Slovenia being the first and only new EU 
member state to adopt the single European currency, the euro, in January 2007. 
At the same time, institutions were being set up to enable Slovenia to become 
part of the European Union.  The legal framework was reformed so as to provide 
protection  of  property  rights,  including  shareholders’  rights,  resulting  in  the 
situation that in Slovenia, as elsewhere in transitions systems, the ‘law on the 
books’ provided a higher level of shareholder protection than in most civil law 
countries, and was surpassed in aggregate only by the common law group of 
countries.  
 
The extent of changes in Slovenian company law in the last decade in terms of 
shareholder  protection  is  presented  in  Figure  1.  This  Figure  is  based  on  the 
‘leximetric’ approach to coding legal change.  This makes it possible to compare 
rates of change across countries and gives an approximate ranking to systems 
over time (for further details on leximetric coding techniques and a defence of 
their use, see Siems, 2007 and Armour et al., 2008).  Only changes in the rules 
themselves (norms of company law and those of corporate governance codes) 
are covered, not their practical impact or the level of their enforcement.  The 
gradualist  approach  adopted  in  the  Slovenian  case  is  clear,  in  particular  by 
contrast to the rapid implementation of reforms in Russia.  While the Slovenian 
score has risen from 0.35 in 1995 to nearly 0.6 in 2004 (on the scale from 0 to 
1),  the  level  of  shareholder  protection  in  Slovenia  is  still  below  that  in  the 
U.S.A.  and  U.K.,  while  closely  resembling  the  pattern  of  development  in 
Germany.    
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Figure  1.  Source:  CBR  Shareholder  Protection  Index  (developed  from  Siems  2007  and 
Armour et al., 2008; available on line at  
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-20.htm). 
 
While the processes of economic and legal transition into a market economy 
with a system of private ownership have to a great extent been concluded, with 
regard  to  the  corporate  governance  system  Slovenia  is  still  in  a  transitional 
phase.  Concentrated control structures, a prevalence of insider ownership, the 
relative absence of a cadre of professional managers, low liquidity of capital 
markets,  an  over-heavy  role  for  the  state  in  the  economic  system,  and  a 
continued  role  for  informal  networks  of  relationships  in  business  and 
government, reflect to a great extent the former system of collective ownership 
and worker management, and also echo the chosen method of privatisation.  
 
Privatization in Slovenia resulted in a relatively dispersed ownership structure 
by transition standards. The Law on Ownership Transformation
2 provided for 
the obligatory distribution of 60% of the capital of privatised enterprises on the 
following basis: 20% was allocated to the two state-controlled funds (that is, the 
Pension Fund – KAD, and the Restitution Fund - SOD), 20% was distributed 
among inside owners, while 20% was granted to Privatisation Investment Funds 
(PIFs).    The  remaining  40%  of  the  capital  was  distributed  according  to  the 
model chosen by each company itself, that is, companies could either sell shares 
to inside owners (management, employees and former employees – the ‘internal 
privatisation’  method)  or  to  the  public  (the  ‘external  privatisation’  method). 
More than 90% of companies opted for the former, the internal model (Simoneti  
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et al., 2001). This ownership distribution resulted in the two main groups of 
shareholders contending for control and the right to exercise voting rights at 
general  meetings:  outside  blockholders  on  one  hand,  and  dispersed  insider 
owners on the other hand. 
 
The privatisation period has been followed by post-privatisation processes of 
intense  ownership  and  voting  rights  consolidation.  In  particular,  a  steady 
increase in the size of the largest blockholder has been observed. The share of 
the  largest  shareholder  in  companies  entered  in  the  companies  registry 
maintained  by  Central  Securities  Clearing  Corporation  Inc.  has  increased  by 
14% in the last five years (Bratina et al., 2005). In 2004, as a result, the largest 
shareholder  in  listed  companies  held  on  average  36.9%  of  the  company’s 
capital.  The  proportions  of  shares  held  by  the  second  and  the  third  largest 
shareholder, on the other hand, have remained fairly stable, with the average of 
12.5% and 8.2 %, respectively (see Table 1). This, however, is still lower than in 
other CEE countries in which the median largest stake was reported to be over 
40%, in some countries even substantially exceeding 50% (Berglöf and Pajuste, 
2003).  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Percentage Shares of the Three (C1,C2 
and C3) Largest Shareholders in Slovenian companies 
 
    Listed 
 
C1          C2          C3          sum 
Non-listed 
 
C1          C2          C3          sum 
1999  mean 
n 
23.7        13.0        8.6         45.3 
69           69           69          69    
39.2        15.4        9.3          63.9 
388         388         388         388   
2000  mean 
n 
24.5        12.7        8.5         45.7 
76           76           76          76 
40.2        15.6        8.7          64.5 
469         469         469         469 
2001  mean 
n 
28.6        13.4        9.2         51.2 
80           80           80          80 
43.5        15.9        8.1          67.6 
476         476         476         476   
2002  mean 
n 
23.5        13.4        9.2         54.8 
90           90           90          90 
46.8        15.5        8.1          70.3 
543         543         543         543    
2003  mean 
n 
33.3        13.5        8.8         55.6 
88           88           88          88 
48.7        15.4        7.7          71.8 
527         527         527         527 
2004  mean 
n 
36.9        12.5        8.2         57.6 
89           89           89          89 
52.2        14.9        7.4          74.5 
506         506         506         506 
Source: (Brezigar Masten et al., 2006) 
 
At the same time, insider control has been undergoing a process of increasing 
homogenisation.
3 Post-privatization adjustments to share ownership in Slovenia 
reveal  an  increase  in  managerial  ownership  while  employee  ownership  is 
reported to be declining (Simoneti and Gregoric, 2004). The trend of a slow but 
steady  increase  of  managerial  ownership  is  expected  to  continue  -  empirical  
  15 
studies show that in 2001, the actual level of managerial ownership was still 
10.83 % below the average level desired by managers (Simoneti et al., 2001).  
 
In terms of the identity of large blockholders, the public sector is to the fore. As 
we  have  seen,  privatization  established  two  main  groups  of  blockholders: 
Privatisation  Investment  Funds  (PIFs)  and  state-controlled  funds  (KAD  and 
SOD), which on average jointly obtained 40% of equity capital at the end of the 
privatization  period  (Simoneti  et  al.,  2001).  During  the  consolidation  period 
which followed, shares of the latter increased so that at the end of 2004 the 
largest shares in about 44% of Slovenian companies were owned by the two 
state-controlled  funds  (Bratina  et  al.,  2005).  In  addition,  post-privatisation 
processes  led  to  the  emergence  of  a  new  type  of  large  blockholder,  that  is, 
domestic  non-financial  firms  with  large  blocks  of  shares  which  had  been 
transferred to them from the privatization investment funds (Brezigar Masten et 
al., 2006). Strategic and foreign ownership, on the other hand, is very limited, 
with banks and foreigners having obtained less than 3 percent of firms’ shares 
during  the  privatisation  period  (Simoneti  et  al.,  2001).  At  the  present  time, 
foreign investors hold approximately 13% of all shares in Slovenian companies, 
which still put Slovenia well beyond other transition economies as well as the 
EU  average.  For  foreign  portfolio  investors,  Slovenian  companies  largely 
remain of limited interest, with an entry to companies only being attractive if 
they can take controlling stakes. 
 
The  chosen  privatization  method,  which  combined  voluntary  listing  with  an 
admittance of securities in the official capacity of the Ljubljana Stock Exchange 
(LJSE),  has  also  influenced  the  pace  of  the  evolution  of  Slovenian  capital 
markets. The LJSE was re-established and stock markets opened at the end of 
1989. The regulated LJSE market is today divided into an official and semi-
official  market,  with  over  200  securities  listed  on  both  markets.  A  special 
segment of the official market is the prime market, which aims at promoting the 
most prominent Slovenian issuers to the international investment community. 
Issuers  on  the  prime  market  are  required  to  meet  certain  quantitative  and 
liquidity criteria and to observe additional disclosure obligations.
4 With total 
capitalisation of around 22.5 billion EUR in 2006, the LJSE has remained fairly 
small compared to other CEE markets. Despite its small size, however, on a 
relative basis the LJSE market is well developed, with market capitalisation of 
shares (excluding investment funds) reaching 42% of Slovenian GDP in 2006.  
 
However, the LJSE market is characterised by low liquidity. The average daily 
turnover in 2006 amounted to modest 4.03 million EUR and the total turnover 
amounted  to  around  996.48  million  EUR  –  although  following  on  from  an 
increase of over 70% from 2005, the turnover figures have recently reached their  
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second highest level in the history of the LJSE.
 5 The general illiquidity of the 
market is however further pronounced when the limited range of traded shares is 
taken into account:  in 2006 the great majority of the trades were executed on 
the prime market with only 8 listed shares, which represents an overwhelming 
72.2 % of the total trade in shares.
6 
 
Several features of the current situation suggest that the process of transition in 
Slovenia is still going on. The state is expected to diminish its role in economy 
further  and,  in  particular,  to  exit  from  the  banking  and  insurance  sector.  
Ownership  concentrations  have  not  yet  been  solidified,  with  domestic 
households still holding a sizable portion of equities.  At the same time, trading 
on Slovenian capital markets has not reached the levels hoped for.  A second 
wave  of  privatisations  is  expected  to  provide  a  trigger  for  liquidity  and  the 
further  adjustment  of  corporate  ownership  structures.    As  this  further  phase 
begins,  a  greater  prominence  is  being  given  to  EU-level  norms  and  self-
regulatory codes. The Slovenian corporate governance code was adopted against 
the  background  of  adjustment  to  EU  legal  requirements  in  the  run-up  to 
Slovenia’s  entry  into  the  Union.    Unlike  in  other  transition  countries,  the 
adoption of the Slovenian Code (in March 2004) almost exactly coincided with 
the Slovenian accession to the European Union (in May 2004).  At this time, 
there was a perception that a number of outstanding issues – the question of 
minority shareholder protection, the lack of the robust pressure from foreign 
investor  community,  the  role  of  the  state  as  a  powerful  owner,  and 
underdeveloped  role  of  domestic  capital  markets  as  in  sanctioning  weak  or 
inefficient    managements  –  needed  to  be  addressed.    The  2004  Code  was 
therefore  introduced  at  a  critical  point  in  Slovenia’s  corporate  governance 
development. 
   
4. Empirical findings on the reception and implementation of the Slovenian 
Code 
 
In this part we examine the evolution of the Slovenian legislative framework 
following  the  adoption  of  the  self-regulatory  Code  and  analyze  companies’ 
responses  to  the  Code.  The  analysis  is  based  on  a  population  of  companies 
whose shares were traded on the official market of the LJSE as of 31 May 2006, 
comprising of 26 companies, 7 of which were listed on the LJSE Prime market. 
Data are gathered from companies’ declarations of compliance with the Code 
issued  on  or  before  31  May  2006
7  and  relate  to  the  implementation  of  the 
revised text of the Code of December 2005.  
 
The text of the Code of December 2005,
8 which is addressed to all joint-stock 
companies,  consists  of  recommended  governance  principles  organised  by  
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paragraphs. The text of the Code contains eight paragraphs, which are further 
divided into several subparagraphs or provisions, following the Preamble and a 
definition  of  terms  used  in  the  Code.  The  first  paragraph  determines  the 
relationship  between  the  corporation,  shareholders,  and  other  stakeholders.  It 
contains provisions on the company’s goals; equal treatment of shareholders and 
protection  of  their  rights  (including  protection  of  minority  shareholders); 
provisions  on  the  general  meeting  of  shareholders;  and  provisions  on  the 
relationship between the company and other stakeholders. The second paragraph 
focuses on the management board. It restates the statutory duties and liabilities 
of the management board; it recommends detailed criteria for its composition, 
remuneration,  compensation  and  other  benefits  and  ownership  of  company 
shares; it also addresses the issue of conflicts of interest of management board 
members.  Similarly,  the  third  paragraph  defines  duties  and  liabilities  of  the 
supervisory board; it recommends criteria for the composition, remuneration, 
compensation  and  other  benefits  and  ownership  of  company’s  shares  and 
addresses the conflict of interest of supervisory board members. In addition, it 
also defines the supervisory board’s role in the appointment and removal of the 
management  board  as  well  as  containing  detailed  recommendations  on  the 
formation  of  supervisory  board  committees,  and  specifically  an  audit,  a 
nomination committee and a remuneration committee.  This is the longest and 
most  detailed  chapter  of  the  Code.    In  the  fourth  paragraph,  the  nature  of 
cooperation  between  management  and  the  supervisory  board  is  considered, 
including provisions on compliance with corporate governance principles and 
provisions  on  actions  related  to  takeover  procedures.  In  the  fifth  paragraph, 
associated companies are addressed. The sixth paragraph focuses on audit and 
the  system  of  internal  control,  and  the  seventh  paragraph  contains  detailed 
recommendations on disclosure of the relevant information. To mention but a 
few, this chapter includes provisions on reporting and annual and semi-annual 
reports; data from the corporate prospectus; the schedule of the company’s more 
significant announcements; resolutions of the supervisory board; the company 
ownership structure cross-holdings and takeovers; share ownership of members 
of a company’s management board and supervisory board; amendments of the 
articles of association; admission to and withdrawal from the regulated market; 
the manner of dealing with press rumours including the form and location of 
disclosure; public announcements outside the country; data confidentiality; the 
company’s  communication  strategy;  and  the  company’s  website.  The  eighth 
paragraph contains provisions on implementing the code.  
 
Code provisions specify and clarify a number of statutory rules, set out good 
corporate governance practice, and summarize relevant regulations. As stated in 
the Preamble of the Code, ‘the purpose of the Code is to define in more detail 
the principles of directing and managing public joint-stock companies, whose  
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shares are listed on the regulated market’.
9 Notwithstanding its focus on public 
joint-stock  companies  whose  shares  are  listed  on  the  regulated  market,  the 
signatories of the Code also made an appeal to the other public and non-public 
companies to apply the recommended governance practices, in order to establish 
a  transparent  and  understandable  governance  system  that  would  enhance  the 
investor confidence and overall trust in the management of Slovenian public 
companies.  In  addition,  by  clarifying  statutory  rules  and  summarize  relevant 
regulation,  the  Code  aims  to  make  core  corporate  law  more  accessible  to 
domestic and foreign investors.  It is particularly significant that the Code aims 
to bridge the gap between existing and future legal regulation. In line with the 
purpose  of  the  Code,  its  provisions  encompass  not  just  certain  part  of  the 
relevant Slovenian legislation, but also ethical standards of business culture and 
the internal bylaws of the three organizations that drafted and signed the Code 
(the Ljubljana Stock Exchange, the Managers’ Association of Slovenia and the 
Association  of  the  Supervisory  Board  Members  of  Slovenia),  as  well  as 
internationally recognised governance norms. 
 
4.1 The impact on the legal system 
Our analysis suggests that the adoption of the Code has already had an impact 
on the wider legal system within which it is placed, triggering certain changes in 
company and financial law and supporting the process of adjustment to the EU-
level norms. Several norms that had initially been introduced as self-regulatory 
recommendations  have  subsequently  found  their  way  into  the  legislative 
framework. To illustrate, the use of a company’s website as means of facilitating 
the  access  to  the  relevant  information  related  to  the  company  was  an  initial 
recommendation of self-regulatory Code. The Code specified that the contents 
of the company’s website should be made available in both the Slovenian and 
English language and recommended that the company should ensure access on 
its  website  to  all  information  that  should  be  publicly  available,  after  this 
information had been publicly announced. Extensive deviations from these Code 
provisions  in  2004  led  to  increased  statutory  requirements.  The  Securities 
Market Act was amended (ZTVP-1A)  to add an obligation of a company to 
ensure that all information that has the characteristics of insider information is 
available on the official website of the company for at least seven days, violation 
of which results in heavy fine.
10  
 
In a similar way, provisions on the role of supervisory board committees have 
been transformed from soft law recommendations to regulatory norms. In 2004 
the  Code  introduced  the  recommendation  for  the  supervisory  board  to  form 
special committees with the aim of improving the effectiveness of the board’s 
work.  The  Code  recommends  the  use  of  board  sub-committees  to  carry  out 
governance  tasks  and  refers  specifically  to  the  role  of  an  audit  committee,  
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nomination  committee  and  remuneration  committee;  it  provides  detailed 
recommendations as to their formation and responsibilities. Since 2005, these 
recommendations  have  also  been  incorporate  into  the  new  Companies  Act 
(ZGD-1), as opt-in provisions. Pursuant to the ZGD-1, the supervisory board 
may set up one or more committees, with the same aim as the one declared in 
the Code.
11 The Act specifically regulates the setting up of audit committees, 
reiterating and extending their responsibilities established in the initial text of 
the Code. Notwithstanding the general preference for optional or default rules 
over  mandatory  ones,  companies  that  have  opted  for  a  one-tier  system  of 
corporate governance are obliged set up an audit committee, if their securities 
are traded on the organised market or employees exercise their co-determination 
rights in compliance with the law.
12     
 
Individual disclosure of financial benefits of members of the management board 
offers a further example of regulatory learning. The initial text of the Code had 
introduced  a  provision  recommending  that  remuneration,  compensation  and 
other benefits paid to members of the management board members should be 
disclosed for each individual member rather than for the board as a whole, as 
had been the practice before. This provision initiated an intense public debate 
and was one of the most frequently deviated from Code provisions in 2004. As a 
response, an amendment to the Securities Markets Act of August 2004 (ZTVP-
1A) introduced the individual disclosure of financial benefits of members of the 
management board as an obligatory element of a company prospectus.  Pursuant 
to ZTVP-1A, material changes of all data contained in the prospectus, including 
individual disclosure of financial benefits of members of the management board 
had  to  be  specified  in  the  annual  report  and  its  summary.  The  content  of 
prospectuses  and  individual  disclosure  of  benefits  are  now  regulated  by  the 
directly  applicable  Commission  Regulation  809/2004
13  as  an  implementing 
measure of the Prospectus Directive.
14 Similar recommendations as regards the 
contents of the prospectus, the  manner  of its publication and issuance of an 
annual document were introduced into the Code as a result of amendments of 
December  2005.  The  Code  recommends  that  companies  should publish  their 
updated prospectus, or the significant changes of data stated in the prospectus at 
least once a year. In addition, it states that a company’s website should contain 
all essential information on the company and its business operations, including 
the updated prospectus or significant changes of data stated in the prospectus. 
Subsequently, after a period to allow for adjustment on the part of companies, 
these recommendations were embedded into Slovenian legislative framework as 
amendments  to  the  Securities  Markets  Act  of  2006  (ZTVP-1B)  that  has 
transposed  into  Slovenian  law  requirements  of  the  Prospectus  Directive 
concerning the annual document and Commission Regulation 809/2004.
15   
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In a similar way, the Code has assisted the process of adjustment to the EU 
Accounting directive 78/660 EEC.
16   The 2006 amendment of this Directive
17 
requires  a  company  whose  securities  are  admitted  to  trading  on  a  regulated 
market  to  include  a  corporate  governance  statement  in  its  annual  report.  In 
Slovenia this requirement was first introduced as a Code recommendation and 
subsequently transposed into Slovenian law. Pursuant to the 2006 amendments 
to  the  Companies  Act  (ZGD-1),  joint-stock  companies  as  well  as  large  and 
medium-size limited liability companies are obliged to issue this declaration of 
compliance as a part of their annual report. Furthermore, the Code recommends 
the  introduction  of  requirements  of  the  Directive  on  the  exercise  of  the 
shareholders’ voting rights,
18 including the facilitation of proxy voting and an 
obligation to post all relevant information for the general meeting and adopted 
resolutions  on  the  issuer’s  website.  Since  the  transposition  deadline  for  the 
Directive is Summer 2009, it is expected that the soft-law recommendations will 
soon be transmitted into the Slovenian legislative framework. 
 
Thus the Code has played a significant role in triggering developments in the 
wider legal system.  Its impact on the legal system and on the overall level of 
shareholder protection can be seen in Figure 1 above, which indicates a sharp 
increase the level of shareholder protection from 2004 onwards. In many cases, 
provisions of the Code which started off as voluntary measures (or at any rate 
subject to the requirement of comply or explain) were then given statutory form.  
At first sight this might seem to undermine the reflexive dimension of the Code.  
However, the Code is playing a wider role in Slovenia’s legal transition: by 
means of an ‘indirect’ legal strategy, through the incorporation of measures into 
the  Code  prior  to  their  inclusion  in  legislation,  the  Code  has  increased 
familiarity  with  the  relevant  provisions,  and  has  cushioned  their  immediate 
impact on companies.  This has also served to smooth the process of adjustment 
to EU standards. 
 
4.2 The impact on companies and corporate reporting 
Our  empirical  research  also  provides  evidence  on  the  impact  of  codes  on 
organizations.  Companies’  responses  to  the  Code  suggest  that  a  tendency 
towards a ‘pooling equilibrium’  can be observed. On the whole, companies’ 
implementation strategies are strikingly similar both in terms of the contents of 
deviations from the Code as well as in the type of explanation for deviations. 
With  regard  to  the  former,  a  significant  overlap  in  disclosed  provisions  is 
observed, with disclosure of information and financial reporting (paragraph 7 of 
the Code), issues related to the supervisory board (paragraph 3 of the Code) and 
the relationship between the corporation, shareholders and other stakeholders 
(paragraph  1  of  the  Code),  being  the  main  corporate  governance  provisions 
deviated from by companies. In particular, over 40% of the companies analysed  
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deviate from recommendations for companies to define corporate goals in their 
articles of association, define criteria for assessing the existence of conflicts of 
interest, publish announcements in the English language and prepare financial 
statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. 
 
At  the  same  time,  a  trend  of  increased  compliance  with  the  Code  can  be 
observed, revealing the adaptation of corporate practices to the Code provisions 
in comparison to declarations of 2004. Figure 2 illustrates the most frequently 
deviated from provisions in 2004 and their disclosure in 2006. In 2004 non-
compliance with identified provisions was disclosed by a number of companies, 
ranging from 40% to an overwhelming 77% of the population in the case of 
some provisions of the Code. 11 provisions in total surpassed the 40% non-
compliance benchmark, 5 of which exhibited non-compliance of over 60%. In 
declarations of 2006, however, none of these provisions was deviated from by 
more than 35% of all companies in the population.
 19 In fact, a detailed content 
analysis reveals that even the 35% non-compliance benchmark is misleading, as 
several deviations from provision 7.5.1 relate to the recommendations made for 
the contents of websites in the revised text of the Code of 2005, rather than to 
the initial Code recommendations of 2004. In reality, therefore, the number of 
deviations of identified provisions in 2006 does not exceed 31%.  
 
At the same time, the observed quality of declarations is low and valid comply-
or-explain declarations represent a minority of all declarations. What is more, 
some disclosures and justifications are altogether identical, even copy-pasted. In 
most cases, companies do not explain why they deviate from a particular Code 
provision but simply disclose this fact, or provide the disclosure by literally 
describing  their  corporate  practices.  Moreover,  closer  scrutiny  of  these 
disclosures  reveals  that  several  of  these  descriptions  do  not  disclose  non-
compliance at all, but rather indicate the way in which the particular company 
complied  with  the  Code.  In  addition,  companies  frequently  disclose  non-
compliance  at  the  same  time  as  indicating  an  intention  to  comply  with  the 
relevant provision in the future.  The degree of variety in the type of disclosure 
of  non-compliance  has  also  been  reduced  from  2004  in  2006.  Incomplete 
declarations (a general statement of compliance in which a company declares its 
overall acceptance of the Code provisions without making a specific reference to 
them) have been eliminated and a decrease in the number of pure disclosures 
(without any additional explanation) can be identified, coupled with a significant 
increase in declarations containing both a disclosure of non-compliance and a 
description of deviating practices. Surprisingly, however, no increase in proper 
comply-or-explain declarations containing disclosure of deviation together with 
a description of deviating practice and a justification for this deviation can be 
observed.  
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Figure 2: Corporate Governance Index 2004 and non-compliance with the 













































Code Provision    The Summary Contents of the Provision 
1.2.6.   The announcement of the convening of the shareholder  meeting by publishing all 
relevant information on the company’s web site. 
1.2.8.       Timely public announcement of relevant information on supervisory board nominees. 
2.3.7.       Individual disclosure of remuneration of the members of the management board.  
2.3.10.   Internal bylaw provision to specify the rules on limitation of trading and on disclosure 
of trading in company shares. 
3.4.1.       Criteria for the remuneration of the members of the supervisory board. 
3.4.2.       Components of the remuneration of the members of the supervisory board. 
3.4.3.       Individual disclosure of remuneration of the members of the supervisory board. 
6.1.4.       The presence of the auditor at the shareholder meeting. 
7.1.7.   Publication  of  the  calendar  of  essential  announcements  and  its  availability  on  the 
company’s website.  
7.4.1.   The contents of a company’s website. 




Despite these ‘pooling’ trends, a certain degree of variation in declarations is 
observable along the lines of market segmentation and different listing régimes, 
indicating  weak  signs  of  a  separating  equilibrium.  Companies  listed  on  the 
prime market
20 on the whole exhibit both greater compliance with the Code as 
well as a higher quality of disclosure compared to firms whose shares are traded 
on the official market. Of the total of seven firms listed on the prime market,
21 
two  have  disclosed  deviation  from  one  Code  provision  only.  Moreover,  the 
deviated-from  practices  in  this  case  mainly  relate  to  the  more  recently  
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introduced Code provisions, and the quality of explanation for deviations on the 
prime market is above average.  
 
Our observations indicate the existence of a common understanding of Code 
provisions by Slovenian companies and the emergence of a shared interpretation 
of the context of the Code. Companies are inclined towards achieving greater 
compliance  with  the  Code  without  wishing  to  stand  out  with  respect  to  the 
reasons given for justifying deviations; they are less concerned with improving 
information  flows  by  providing  detailed  justifications  for  deviations. 
Accordingly, a ‘herding effect’ is observed, leading to an equilibrium in which 
companies end up complying and doing very little explaining if they do not. 
This is perhaps the paradox of the comply-or-explain principle; although it is 
meant to trigger an information flow and allow for a market response, variety 
may  get  crowded  out.    The  observed  effect  of  the  Code  in  the  form  of  an 
increased overall level of governance practices may be taken to be a sign of the 
increasing  effectiveness  of  the  corporate  governance  system  (Aguilera  and 
Cuervo-Cazurra,  2004).  However,  if  corporate  governance  arrangements  are 
seen as endogenous to the managerial practices and trajectories of individual 
firms (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), a certain level of variation in compliance with 
the Code might be expected.  Diversity in the justifications for deviations is 
desirable in order to enable investors to adopt investment decisions on the basis 
of fuller information.  Variable compliance should therefore be welcomed as 
providing evidence both of a learning process on the part of firms and investors, 
and of the effective matching of governance structures to firms’ characteristics.  
These effects together should result in improved corporate performance and a 
reduction in the cost of capital
 22 On this basis, limits to the effectiveness of the 
Slovenian Code in stimulating institutional learning have wider implications for 




Our  theoretical  discussion  identified  three  features  of  corporate  governance 
codes around which an empirical study could be conducted.  The first was the 
sense in which codes operate as transnational instruments of regulatory change.  
The law and economics approach sees codes as a mechanism for enhancing the 
efficiency  of  corporate  governance  regimes,  but  also  acknowledges  potential 
obstacles to their diffusion in the form of opposition from vested interests and 
institutional  blockages.    The  comparative  political  economy  perspective  sees 
codes  as  having  a  potentially  destabilising  influence  in  coordinated  market 
systems, and, by extension, in transition economies.  We saw, however, that a 
systems-theoretic viewpoint offered a third possibility, namely that codes, as 
‘irritants’,  would  not  necessarily  be  rejected  any  more  than  they  would  be  
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transposed  completely  straightforwardly,  but  could  be  expected  to  trigger  a 
series of responses in host systems, at both the legal and economic level.  We 
find  support  in  our  case  study  for  the  suggestion  that  neither  complete 
integration, nor complete rejection, results from transposition.  The adoption of 
the Slovenian code has not led to an alignment of the Slovenian system with the 
model of diffuse share ownership and liquid capital markets which is associated 
with the code model in general, and even allowing for the limited period of time 
which has elapsed since its adoption, it is not clear that it will have this effect in 
future.  However, the code has played an important part in the wider process of 
assimilation of the legal system to transnational norms, in particular those of EU 
company law directives, and has helped to smooth the transition process more 
generally.  To that extent, the code has operated as an important legitimating 
force  in  the  sense  identified  by  Aguilera  and  Cuervo-Cazurra  (2004), 
independently  of  its  operation  as  a  force  for  greater  efficiency  in  the  wider 
economic order. 
 
The second dimension of our study concerns the nature of codes as ‘linking 
institutions’ with a dual economic and legal dimension.  The empirical study 
provides support for the theoretical claim made by systems theory, namely that 
codes are capable of triggering ‘co-evolutionary’ movements in the economic 
and  legal  systems.    By  means  of  an  ‘indirect’  legal  strategy,  the  corporate 
governance code increases familiarity with novel provisions, and ‘softens’ their 
eventual introduction into the legally binding framework. In other words, the 
code triggers internal demand for law within the legal system. It thereby helps to 
ensure the internal congruence of the system, and consequently, increases the 
effectiveness  of  legal  reform.  Through  the  use  of  self-regulation,  moreover, 
adjustment  to  the  demands  of  legality  is  achieved, a  necessary  element  of a 
successful transplantation and an effective corporate governance reform.   
 
However, the third dimension of our study, which focuses specifically on the 
‘comply  or  explain’  mechanism,  suggests  that  there  are  also  limits  to  the 
capacity of codes to operate as forms of reflexive governance.  A critical issue is 
whether codes based on the ‘comply or explain principle’ result in divergence or 
standardization  of  corporate  practice.    To  use  the  language  of  comparative 
institutional economics, the responses of companies are likely to result in either 
a ‘pooling equilibrium’, in which companies cluster around a standard set of 
practices,  or  a  ‘separating  equilibrium’  in  which  different  responses  to  the 
‘comply or explain’ requirement lead to diversity of practice and provide the 
basis for a learning process.  In principle, either result is possible; empirical 
research is needed to establish which one actually prevails, and to explain why. 
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Our empirical study finds that a tendency towards a pooling equilibrium can be 
observed, reflected in responses, to the Code’s implementation, of companies 
whose shares are listed on the official market.  Companies are complying with 
the Code in a broadly similar way, both in terms of the contents of deviations as 
well as in the type of disclosure and explanations for deviations. Over time, 
there has been an increasing compliance with Code provisions.  However, the 
quality of disclosures is low, with effective explanations for non-compliance 
rarely being offered.  This is perhaps a sign of a more general problem with 
‘reflexive’ models of governance.  There is a danger that corporate governance 
codes  which  are  drafted  as  default  rules  subject  to  the  ‘comply  or  explain’ 
approach, quickly acquire a hard edge in practice.  While such an outcome may 
serve to enhance the legitimacy of the transition process, it also suggests that 






1  Directive 93/13/EC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, implemented in the 
UK in the form of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994 
(SI 1994/3159) (now in a revised form: SI 1999/2083). 
2 Official Gazette of RS, No.55/1992 and further changes. 
3 Insider privatization prevailed in Russia, the former Yugoslavia and Poland. 
Outsider privatisation, on the other hand, was carried out in the Czech Republic 
by voucher privatization and Estonia by direct sales of state property. In these 
countries  as  well  as  in  Slovakia,  insider  control  is  weaker.  There,  special 
investment  privatization  funds  were  created  specifically  for  the  purpose  of 
ensuring the accountability of management. 
4  As  of  31  May  2006  market  capitalisation  of  shares  on  the  Prime  Market 
accounted for 72.9 % of market capitalisation of all shares traded on the official 
market. 
5 See LJSE Annual Statistical Report 2006. 
6 See LJSE Annual Report 2006. 
7 The LJSE Rules require issuers whose shares are traded on the official market 
to make a public disclosure of the declaration of compliance no later than on the 
publication date of the summary of the annual report, that is, five months after 
the termination of a business year (Articles 36a and 42 of the LJSE Rules). 
8 Further amendments to the Code were adopted in February 2007. 
9 The Corporate Governance Code for Public Joint-Stock Companies, Preamble. 
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10 ZTVP-1A, Article 391, Para. 1, Line 7. Note that in 2007 ZTVP with all its 
subsequent  changes  has  been  replaced  by  the  Law  on  markets  in  financial 
instruments  (ZTFI),  implementing  Directive  2004/39/EC  of  the  European 
Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  21  April  2004  on  markets  in  financial 
instruments (MiFID). 
11 ZGD-1, Article 279. 
12 ZGD-1, Article 289, Para. 3. In 2008 the audit committee requirement has 
been  extended  to  all  companies  whose  securities  are  traded  on  a  regulated 
market,  pursuant  to  the  requirement  of  the  Directive  2006/43/EC  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of 
annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending Council Directives 78/ 
660/EEC and 83/349/EEC and repealing Council Directive 84/253/EEC. 
13 Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/2004 of 29 April 2004. 
14 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to 
the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC. 
15 A mentioned above (Supra 12), in 2007 ZTVP with all its subsequent changes 
has  been  replaced  by  the  Law  on  markets  in  financial  instruments  (ZTFI), 
implementing  Directive  2004/39/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments (MiFID). 
16  Council  Directive  78/660/EEC  on  the  annual  accounts  of  certain  types  of 
companies. . 
17 Directive 2006/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
June 2006 amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC on the annual accounts of 
certain types of companies, 83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts, 86/635/EEC 
on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial 
institutions and 91/674/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts 
of insurance undertakings. 
18 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies. 
19  It  should  be  noted  that  some  of  these  provisions  were  subsequently  re-
numbered in the text of the Code of 2005. 
20 As of 31 May 2006 market capitalisation of shares traded on the Prime Market 
accounted for 72.9 % of market capitalisation of all shares traded on the Official 
Market. 
21 As of 31 May 2006.  
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22 In the context of the UK’s Combined Code, Arcot and Bruno (2007) also 
report a tendency over time towards higher levels of compliance.  They show, 
however, that companies which offer good explanations for deviating from the 
provisions of the Code have a higher level of performance, on average, not just 
than companies which offer inadequate explanation, but also than those which 
report full compliance.  They conclude that ‘companies, which have carefully 
thought about the application of the Code to their specific circumstances, are 
more likely to provide better explanations of their choice and are thus likely to 
be well governed, which is reflected in their performance’ (2007: 4).  
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